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NUCLEAR GENOCIDE IN CANADA Part 2 Nuclear Reactors in Canada "It is not right to say that a catastrophic accident is impossible. The worst possible accident could involve the spread of radioactive poisons over large areas, killing thousands immediately, killing others through increased susceptibility to cancer, risking genetic defects that could affect future generations, and possibly contaminating large land areas for future habitation or cultivation." (Safety of Ontario's Nuclear Reactors, Select Committee on Ontario Hydro Affairs, 1980) ZEEP (Zero Energy Experimental Pile) The ZEEP Reactor started operating at Chalk River in 1945. It was the first reactor to be built outside the United States. NRX Reactor The NRX reactor began operating at Chalk River in 1947 to produce plutonium for the United States weapons program. The NRX reactor was shut down in 1993. There was a major accident at the reactor in 1952. According to Dr. Gordon Edwards: "The NRX reactor underwent a violent power excursion that destroyed the core of the reactor, causing some fuel melting. Unaccountably, the shut-off rods failed to fully descend into the core. A series of hydrogen gas explosions (or steam explosions) hurled the four-ton gasholder dome four feet through the air where it jammed in the superstructure. Thousands of curies of fission products were released into the atmosphere, and a million gallons of radioactively contaminated water had to be pumped out of the basement and 'disposed of' in shallow trenches not far from the Ottawa River. The core of the NRX reactor could not be decontaminated; it had to be buried as radioactive waste." (Dr. Gordon Edwards, CCNR) The following is from a letter written to the Ottawa Citizen (June 25, 2007) by two sisters whose father was severely injured in the NRX accident: "It was a major explosion that demolished one whole building, killed one person and severely injured several others. One of the injured was our father. Charles Weary spent a month in hospital. To counteract contamination, his head and body were shaved and he was washed repeatedly with acid. For the rest of his life he triggered Geiger counters, feared going blind and picked bits of metal from under his skin." "No compensation was offered to the victims and publicity was carefully controlled only a small item on page 2 of the Ottawa Journal of that time. We hear of accidents at nuclear facilities in other countries, but Canada's record is officially clean. Wiped clean?" (Barbara & Donna Weary) This account of the accident contradicts Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's (AECL) version. AECL maintains that there were no deaths or major injuries. For further information on the NRX and NRU accidents, go to Dr. Gordon Edwards' website: 'Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility' and read the article titled: 'Reactor Accidents at Chalk River.' Dr. Edwards' website is the most complete collection of material on the nuclear history of Canada. The majority of the material is easy to read and well written. Dr. Edwards has spent the past 40 years educating Canadians about the dangers of the nuclear fuel cycle as well as attempting to hold the industry and the government accountable. NRU Reactor (National Research Universal) The NRU reactor, built in 1957, was used to bombard different materials with neutrons to generate radioactive isotopes for medicine and other applications. The reactor is still being used to supply 50% of the world's medical isotopes. A major accident occurred at the NRU Reactor in 1958. According to Dr. Gordon Edwards: "Several metallic uranium fuel rods in the NRU reactor overheated and ruptured inside the reactor core. One of the damaged rods caught fire and was torn in two as it was being removed from the core by a robotic crane. As the remote-controlled crane passed overhead, carrying the larger portion of the damaged rod, a three-foot length of fiercely burning uranium fuel broke off and fell into a shallow maintenance pit. The burning fuel lay there, spreading deadly fission products and alpha-emitting particles throughout the reactor building. The ventilation system was jammed in the 'open' position, thereby contaminating the accessible areas of the building as well as a sizable area downwind from the reactor site. A relay team of scientists and technicians eventually extinguished the fire by running past the maintenance pit at top speed wearing full protective gear, dumping buckets of wet sand on the burning uranium fuel." (Dr. Gordon Edwards, CCNR) These two accidents released huge amounts of radioactive material into the water and air around the facilities. As usual, there is no record within the nuclear regulators showing the areas which were impacted by these accidents. Cleanups of Reactor Accidents Armed Forces personnel were sent to Chalk River in 1952 and 1958 to clean up after the NRX and the NRU reactors had severe accidents. The Canadian Government did not warn them of the dangers they faced from these high-level radioactive contaminants. The following is the account of one of the Veterans as told to Dr. Gordon Edwards. "Hundreds of raw army recruits at Petawawa were to be sent into the NRU reactor building with mops and scrub brushes, wearing three layers of protective clothing, and breathing through respirators equipped with charcoal filters. Because of the intense penetrating gamma radiation fields, against which the protective gear offered almost no protection, the men were only allowed to work for about an hour. By that time they were ankle-deep in sweat inside their rubber suits, and they had accumulated a dose of radiation exposure which approached the annual permissible dose limit for atomic workers." (Gordon Edwards) There were no follow-up health studies on any of these Veterans to quantify the impact the exposure to elevated levels of radiation had on their health. The Canadian Government is still refusing to pay compensation 56 years after the fact. Sadly, the Canadian government is spending more money on lawyers fighting the Veterans in court than it would cost them to pay compensation. NPD (Nuclear Power Demonstration) The NPD reactor was the first reactor built in Canada to generate electricity. It was a joint venture of AECL, General Electric and Ontario Hydro. The NPD reactor started producing electricity in 1962 at Rolphton, Ontario. It was shut down in 1987. Douglas Point Reactor The first CANDU reactor started operating at Douglas Point on Lake Huron in 1967. It took seven years to build. It was a 200 megawatt reactor. Pickering Generating Station The first two reactors at Pickering started operating in 1971. All four Pickering A reactors were producing electricity by 1973. The first Pickering reactor was shut down for re-tubing in 1983 after less than 12 years of service which was far sooner than AECL's prediction of a 40-year working life. By 1993, all four reactors at Pickering A were re-tubed and back in service. The Pickering reactors had numerous incidents, accidents and spills over the years. There were times when the problems went on for weeks and months at a time without detection or being reported. The following incidents (compiled by David Martin) were a few of the more severe occurrences. August 1, 1983 Pickering reactor 2 had a 'loss of coolant accident' (LOCA), after a pressure tube suffered a metre-long rupture. The entire station was shut down. The four reactors at Pickering 'A' were eventually re-tubed at a cost of about $1 billion more than the original $716 million cost of the station. November 22, 1988 Pickering reactor 1 had a power excursion caused by operator error that caused damage to 36 fuel bundles. The cooling system was contaminated by radioactive iodine, which was vented over several weeks following the accident. Ontario Hydro did not believe that such an accident was possible, and had to revise its operating procedures and retrain staff. August 2, 1992 Pickering reactor 1 had a heavy water leak from a heat exchanger that resulted in a release of 2,300 trillion becquerels of radioactive tritium into Lake Ontario. This was the worst-ever tritium release from a CANDU reactor, and resulted in increased levels of tritium in drinking water from Whitby to Burlington. December 10, 1994 Pickering reactor 2 had a major 'loss of coolant accident' (LOCA). A pipe break resulted in a spill of 185 tonnes of heavy water. For the first time ever, at a CANDU, the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) was used to prevent a meltdown, and about 200 workers were involved in the clean-up. The reactor was restarted on February 14, 1996. July 21, 1995 Two technicians carried out work on the wrong reactor (Pickering reactor 5 instead of reactor 6), disabling the second fast shutdown system on reactor 5, which was operating at full power at the time. April 15, 1996 Pickering reactor 4 had a heavy water leak from a heat exchanger that resulted in the release of 50 trillion becquerels of tritium into Lake Ontario. The level of tritium in local drinking water peaked at about 100 times the usual level. April 21, 1996 All eight reactors at the Pickering nuclear stations were shut down to repair a backup valve on the Emergency Core Cooling System. The flaw was detected on April 15th, and the system had been tested one month earlier. Hydro did not advise the public of this situation until April 20th. July 30, 1997 Ontario Hydro revealed that it had failed to report tritium contamination of ground water on the Pickering site for twenty years. In 1979 it found 2,150,000 becquerels per litre (Bq/L) of tritium in ground water, and in 1994 found 700,000 Bq/L. Tritium can cause cancer if ingested. Ontario's current 'objective' for tritium in drinking water is 7,000 Bq/L, but in 1994 a provincial advisory committee recommended that this level should be reduced to 100 Bq/L, and brought down to 20 Bq/L within five years. The list of incidents (above) was compiled by David Martin of the Nuclear Awareness Campaign. David Martin has worked tirelessly for the past 2 decades on nuclear issues. He has authored many educational papers as well as submissions and interventions to the nuclear regulators. Reactor Shutdowns On August 13, 1997, Ontario Hydro shut down the four Pickering 'A' reactors which were built by 1973. This action removed 2000 megawatts of generating capacity from Ontario's electrical grid. Units 1 and 4 were subsequently refurbished but they were so far behind schedule and over budget that the decision was made to shut down Units 3 and 4 permanently. Pickering's Reduced Safety Margins In May 2008, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission issued a report saying the safety margins at the Pickering Generating Station have slipped substantially over the years as the reactors continue to age. Decreasing performance and safety margins will require the utility to examine and possibly extend the nuclear emergency planning zone out to 30 kilometres. Bruce Power The first four reactors at Bruce Power went into operation in 1978 followed by four more in 1986. Reactor Shutdown Ontario Hydro shut down the first of the Bruce 'A' reactors in 1995. They followed that up in August 1997 by shutting down the other three Bruce 'A' reactors for poor performance and safety concerns. These reactors lasted less than 20 years before they were deemed too unsafe to operate. All of the reactors would have to be refurbished at a cost higher than their original costs before they were allowed to start up again. The loss of generating capacity from the four Bruce 'A' reactors represented 3400 megawatts of electricity. Harm to Community The heavy water plant at Bruce Power used hydrogen sulphide (sour gas) to extract heavy water from lake water. 'Hydrogen sulfide is a highly toxic and flammable gas. Being heavier than air, it tends to accumulate at the bottom of poorly ventilated spaces. Although very pungent at first, it quickly deadens the sense of smell, so potential victims may be unaware of its presence until it is too late.' (Wikipedia) This gas was released from Bruce Power daily from 1973 to 1997. Exposures as low as 10 parts per million (ppm) cause eye irritation while death can result from exposures over 300 ppm. The Bourgeois family, living on a farm near Bruce Power, suffered severe personal injury as well as heavy losses to their livestock. Bourgeois lost 25% of his lambs each year, or five times the normal losses. Bruce Power owner, Ontario Hydro, was adamant the damage wasn't caused by their heavy water plant, so Mr. Bourgeois hired his own consultants to investigate. 'Experts he retained had unravelled the mystery by 1991: At certain times of the year, a thermal layer of warm air forms; the toxic plume of heavier-than-air hydrogen sulphide gets pulled to ground level and collects in low-lying pockets like his farm. Documents he subsequently uncovered showed that Ontario Hydro had known all along.' 'Other documents revealed that the thermal internal boundary layer the meteorological phenomenon that can trap a chemical plume was flagged to Ontario Hydro and the federal regulator in the early 1970s as a potential problem if the heavy water plant was built at the Bruce site. Ontario Hydro commissioned a further study of the effect in 1984. But no one told Bourgeois.' (April 10, 2004, Kate Harries, Toronto Star) Neither Bruce Power nor the nuclear regulators would deal with the problems caused by the release of hydrogen sulphide, nor would they agree to implement a warning system when conditions put his family and livestock at risk. Mr. Bourgeois came to the same conclusion so many others have in their dealings with the nuclear regulatory body. 'The only explanation I can think of is that our government is corrupt. It is corrupt because it devised a regulatory structure that is entirely geared to ensure that the people who are harmed have no voice.' (Eugene Bourgeois, 2004) Mr. Bourgeois family and farm have not been impacted by the effects of hydrogen sulphide since 1997. It's more than a coincidence that the heavy water plant was shut down that year. For more information on the health impact suffered by the Bourgeois family and animals, read Kate Harries article: 'Sickness, Depression and a Smell of Rotten Eggs' from April 10, 2004 in the Toronto Star. Kate Harries also authored an excellent article on Port Hope for Walrus magazine titled: 'Nuclear Reaction.' Unplanned Shutdown A piece of equipment malfunctioned during maintenance in the reactor core of Unit 6 at Bruce Power on June 11, 2002. A hole was burned through the pressure tube and the calandria tube that surrounds it, which forced Bruce Power to replace both pieces. This caused the reactor to be shut down for the entire summer when demand for electricity is at its highest. 'Power prices get extremely volatile when demand is high and domestic generators can't supply the full market. On occasions when the province had to import emergency power, the IMO had to pay as much as $2 a kilowatt-hour to out-of-province generators. Ontario's normal domestic price is about 5 cents a kilowatt-hour.' (John Spears, Toronto Star) The shutdown was never made public. It only came to light when the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission released their report in September. Bruce Power tried to play down the entire episode. According to the Toronto Star: 'The only news release made by Bruce Power, on June 12, minimized the accident. It said only that a pressure tube had been 'slightly damaged' and 'the operational impact is not expected to be significant.' (John Spears, Toronto Star) The impact of the reactor being shut down may not be significant to Bruce Power. They're not the ones paying $1.6 million per hour to replace the power from the reactor. The taxpayers are. Hiding Safety Violation A serious safety violation at the Bruce Power nuclear station was kept hidden by the staff of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission from its commissioners during hearings held January 16 to determine if two reactors at the site should be allowed to start up again. 'A Bruce Power engineer botched the installation of a super-sensitive instrument that was supposed to detect the lower-than-normal levels of neutrons in the shutdown reactor. Collisions of neutrons cause the controlled chain reaction of nuclear fission that produces the reactor power. But because the low-level detector was put in the wrong place it was useless. The reactor operators only discovered the mistake after three weeks when they started to let the flow of neutrons build up again inside the reactor.' (Peter Calamai, Science reporter) Bruce Power reported the problem to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission on December 23, when they found out about it. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission called it a 'serious event' while Bruce Power CEO Duncan Hawthorne tried to downplay the severity of the event by describing it as 'a technical breach.' Duncan Hawthorne told the Toronto Star that 'The operators caught it (the problem) quickly.' The truth of the matter is that they didn't find out about the problems until three weeks after it happened. The commissioners and the public were not told of the problem until February 12; four weeks after the start of the hearings. Needless to say, the commissioners were not impressed. Soil Contamination 1996 Groundwater monitoring wells at RWOS 1 showed leakage of radioactive contaminates (e.g. tritium), often in excess of the Ontario Drinking Water Objective and even beyond the regulatory Maximum Permissible Concentration (of tritium) for water (MPCw). Data suggest a plume of contaminated groundwater has now reached neighbouring Inverhuron Provincial Park. Slowpoke Reactor The first commercial Slowpoke reactor was built at Chalk River in 1970 and moved to the University of Toronto in 1971. The Slowpoke was designed as a research reactor for universities and as a heating source for large buildings. There are six Slowpoke reactors installed at Canadian universities. One of the main concerns with the Slowpoke was its usage of highly enriched uranium (93%). This is weapons grade material and could be used to manufacture bombs. Some of the Slowpokes were eventually modified to use a less enriched form of uranium. Despite the millions of dollars spent designing and developing the Slowpoke, no foreign market for the reactor ever developed. AECL wasted taxpayers money building a reactor nobody wanted. Gentilly 1 Quebec The Gentilly 1 reactor was a complete failure. It operated sporadically for 180 days before it was permanently shut down. It was AECLss only attempt at building a Light Water Reactor. The reactor cost $120 million to build and taxpayers will be responsible for the eventual costs of decommissioning the reactor and cleaning up the site Gentilly 2 Gentilly 2 is a CANDU 6 reactor that started producing electricity in Quebec in 1983. It was supposed to cost under $400 million with a promise from Ottawa to pay half the total costs. Unfortunately, the final cost was $1.4 billion and Ottawa tried to get away with only paying half the original estimate instead of half the total cost. The Gentilly 2 reactor has performed relatively well except that it costs more to produce electricity with it than the electricity is sold for. Losses over its lifetime are in the billions of dollars. It is scheduled for refurbishment in 2009. Point Lepreau The Point Lepreau reactor is a CANDU 6 model which was started up in 1983. As with most other CANDU reactors, the Point Lepreau reactor had to be refurbished barely halfway through its expected lifespan. The refurbishment was projected to cost $1.4 billion and would be completed by September 2009. The project is already four months behind schedule and over budget. The New Brunswick government said that it costs the province a million dollars a day for replacement power for every day the project is behind schedule. The main cause of the delay is AECL's inability to replace the tubes according to the schedule they laid out. The tools they built for the job have not worked as well as they expected. Further delays were caused when two 107 tonne turbines worth $10 million each, were dropped off a barge in St. John's Harbour. The turbines were sent back to the manufacturer to see if they could be salvaged. CANDU 3 and CANDU 9 These reactors were designed by AECL in the 1980s and early 1990s at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. Unfortunately, AECL was never able to find buyers for them. Darlington The four reactors at Darlington were operational and producing electricity by 1993. They were originally supposed to cost $4 billion. By the time they were completed five years behind schedule, the cost had risen to more than $14 billion. For the most part, the reactors at Darlington have worked quite well. Then again, they are only 16 years old. They are less than halfway through their expected lifespan. It was about this age however, that the Pickering and Bruce Power reactors began to experience severe problems which eventually shut them down until they were refurbished. The only spill of note I came across at Darlington was on February 15, 1993, when 18,000 litres of heavy water spilled. History of the Maple Reactors AECL started building the Maple X-10 reactor in 1990 for MDS Nordion to replace the NRU reactor which had been in operation since 1957 producing medical isotopes for use around the world. After construction was well underway on the Maple X-10, AECL found a major defect that could lead to a loss of coolant accident. In 1993, AECL terminated further development of the Maple X-10 reactor. MDS Nordion started a court action against AECL. According to Natural Resources Canada July 9, 1996: 'In the court action brought forward in October 1993 by Nordion and its parent company, MDS Health Group Limited, a Toronto-based health and life sciences company, the plaintiffs sought $165 million plus interest, or damages totalling $300 million. Nordion was privatized by the federal government in 1991.' 'The action was launched after Atomic Energy of Canada Limited cancelled the Maple X-10 reactor project. This reactor was expected to replace isotope production from the NRU research reactor in Chalk River. The Chalk River nuclear facility is Nordion's primary source for medical isotopes.' (NRCan 1996) As part of the out-of-court settlement reached in 1996, AECL began designing the Maple1 and Maple 2 reactors. The Maple reactors and the adjacent isotope processing facility were to cost $140 million. Maple 1 was to be completed in 1999 and Maple 2 was to be finished in 2000. The NRU reactor would be shut down once the Maple reactors began to produce isotopes. Problems became apparent when they started the reactor. 'As a safety feature, each reactor was designed to have a negative 'power coefficient of reactivity,' or PCR, in which the nuclear reaction in the core decreases as the reactor power increases. Instead, as the reactors were powered up, the exact opposite happened the reaction in the core increased slightly.' (Ian McLeod, Ottawa Citizen, Aug. 13, 2007) Several other problems developed with no solution in sight. In 2006, MDS Nordion finally got fed up poring money ($393 million to that point) into the reactors and reached a mediated settlement with AECL. MDS Nordion was given $68 million in cash and an agreement for a 40 year supply of isotopes worth $344 million. AECL assumed ownership of the reactors and the responsibility for the costs associated with finishing them. AECL worked on the Maple reactors for two more years but were forced to throw in the towel on May 16, 2008. After 18 years and $600 million, AECL had to admit that they couldn't get these relatively simple reactors to work. How do they expect to build a full-size reactor? In addition to the $600 million spent so far, Canadian taxpayers have to spend another $80 million to decommission the reactors. On July 9, 2008, MDS Nordion informed the Canadian Government they were starting a legal action to recover $1.6 billion in compensation for breach of the contract to build the reactors and for the guaranteed supply of isotopes. MDS Nordion were successful in the two previous settlements with AECL and they probably will be again this time. If their legal challenge is successful, these two little reactors that don't work, will have cost Canadian taxpayers $2.3 billion, courtesy of AECL's incompetence. ACR-700 Reactor AECL's Advanced Candu Reactor was a hybrid reactor combining components of Candu Reactors and Light Water Reactors (LWR). In a November 2, 2004 interview, AECL Technologies President John Polcyn told the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) that AECL is spending $1.5 million each week on the ACR-700, with 380 people working on the design and Canadian licensing. Polcyn said that under the current schedule, the Advanced Candu Reactor-700 (ACR-700) could be certified for US use in 2008. Polcyn said 'AECL is talking with several sites in Canada, and hopes to begin the two-year environmental assessment (EA) process on the ACR-700 by the end of the year, and have approval of the EA by late 2006 or early 2007.' AECL submitted the ACR-700 design to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States in 2004 to begin the licensing process. NRC determined the 'coolant void reactivity to be substantially positive in large-break loss-of-coolant accidents (July 1, 2004).' This was disastrous news for AECL as the reactor was designed to have a slightly negative void coefficient of reactivity. Dr. Gordon Edwards explains: 'This is very important. As of 2004, not only does the US analysis show the reactivity void coefficient is positive, but SUBSTANTIALLY positive. That means if any accident such as a large pipe break were to occur, there will be a surge of power which must be very quickly terminated or the reactor fuel will overheat and rupture, releasing radioactive gases and vapours, and the core could even 'disassemble', setting the stage for a potential meltdown.' (Dr. Gordon Edwards 2007) AECL abandoned the ACR-700 shortly after. There is no mention on its website that it ever existed. I've requested the design costs for this reactor, but AECL has not responded to date. ACR-1000 Reactor AECL is currently designing a new reactor called the ACR-1000. It is similar to AECL's ACR-700 which was discontinued when the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission found it's safety features did not work as AECL claimed. AECL says: 'the 'basic design engineering' is complete, and that AECL is now 'confirming and validating' the safety of the reactor at the Canada Nuclear Safety Commission.' (Globe and Mail November 28, 2008) The CNSC does not have the expertise to determine if the ACR-1000 reactor is safe. AECL is turning to the CNSC because they couldn't get the ACR-700 through the licensing process with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the United States. AECL is hoping the cursory certification provided by the CNSC will allow them to bid on reactors contracts while they try to solve the ACR-1000s design problems. AECL says there will be subsequent design work needed when a site is selected, but this is not supposed to be the case. These reactors are supposed to be designed to be built on any site to reduce the time required for the regulatory process. Dr. Frank Greening The following text on CANDU reactors is part of a submission to the Ontario Power Authority by Dr. Frank Greening. Dr. Greening gives an overview of the problems associated with the CANDU reactors. While they do have some strong points, his analysis reveals the weaknesses of the design which have required massive refurbishment of the reactors halfway through their projected life-spans. 'I am a retired nuclear scientist with 23 years experience working for OPG's Research Division in Toronto. I have spent most of my professional career dealing with technical problems with OPG's fleet of CANDU reactors at Pickering, Bruce and Darlington. I am writing to the OPA to urge our electricity supply planners not to recommend the refurbishment or construction of any more CANDU reactors to supplement or replace the Province's existing electrical generating capacity. I base this view largely on the poor performance of certain critical systems inherent to the CANDU reactor design' 'When the CANDU reactor was first introduced in the 1960s, particularly in the demonstration Units at Rolphton and Douglas Point, it was proclaimed by AECL to be a reliable and economic means of producing electricity. Eight larger and even more ambitious versions of the basic CANDU design soon followed at the Pickering and Bruce sites. Initial performance of these Units was promising. Indeed, some early CANDU Units led the world in annual average capacity factor, an accepted measure of reactor reliability.' 'Unfortunately, as Ontario's CANDU reactors approached 20 years of operation, serious problems with critical components started to emerge. Pressure tube integrity became a major issue in the 1980s, while steam generator corrosion and annulus gas problems dominated the l990s. Outlet feeder pipes are the latest CANDU components to suffer from premature failures. Thus, looking at the status of CANDU in the year 2005, we see many of the 22 domestic Units in need of major refurbishments or already abandoned as beyond repair. This situation has arisen within 30 years of the commissioning of most of these Units; worse yet, some Units were shut down for long periods during their lifetime.' 'The hard pill for AECL to swallow is that CANDU's innovative engineering, seen as leading edge in the 1960s, has become its Achilles' heel by the year 2000. This is perhaps not so surprising for 50-year-old technology. After all, many engineering marvels from the 1960s, such as the Space Shuttle and Concorde, have now outlived their usefulness as recent events have so dramatically shown. But, to return to the main thesis of this submission, CANDU was destined to run into difficulties due to the complexity of its design. Corrosion is a well-known concern for all nuclear plant, but when it occurs in essentially inaccessible pipe work, such as the annulus gas system, it presents a problem that is next to impossible to fix.' 'As we have shown, each new problem that developed in CANDU reactors whether it was leaking pressure tube rolled joints, annulus gas system flow blockages or feeder pipe thinning has required more inspections leading to more outages and higher OM&A costs. The CANDU reactor was always an experimental venture; it has had its successes and was probably a worthwhile undertaking because it added to our understanding of nuclear science and engineering. However, it is time to declare the CANDU experiment over, and move on to something simpler, something proven, something better.' (Dr. F. R. Greening August, 2005) These are not the words of a nuclear activist or a tree-hugger. These are statements made by a nuclear scientist who worked on CANDU reactors for 23 years. No one in the world has ordered a CANDU reactor since seven of them were shut down in 1997 only halfway through their expected lifetimes. AECL's track record of designing reactors since then is dismal to say the least. They cancelled the Maple reactors as well as the ACR-700 program because they simply couldn't get the reactors to work. It's time to pull the plug on AECL and quit wasting taxpayers money. End of Part 2 |